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In this paper, we investigate the adversarial robustness of multivariate M -Estimators. In the
considered model, after observing the whole dataset, an adversary can modify all data points
with the goal of maximizing inference errors. We use adversarial influence function (AIF) to
measure the asymptotic rate at which the adversary can change the inference result. We first
characterize the adversary’s optimal modification strategy and its corresponding AIF. From
the defender’s perspective, we would like to design an estimator that has a small AIF. For the
case of joint location and scale estimation problem, we characterize the optimal M -estimator
that has the smallest AIF. We further identify a tradeoff between robustness against adversarial
modifications and robustness against outliers, and derive the optimal M -estimator that achieves
the best tradeoff.
Keywords: Robustness, adversarial attack, M -estimator, adversarial influence function.
1. Ordinary text
Most of the existing work on robust statistical inference mainly address distributional ro-
bustness issues such as outliers or model uncertainties (Huber, 1964; Huber and Ronchetti,
2009; Hampel et al., 2009). As machine learning and statistical inference algorithms
are being increasingly used in safety critical applications and security related appli-
cations (Huval et al., 2015; Buczak and Guven, 2016; Litjens et al., 2016; Nelson et al.,
2008; Soule et al., 2005; Stamp, 2018; Suthaharan, 2014; Vallon et al., 2017; Hoermann et al.,
2018), there is a growing interest in investigating the robustness of statistical inference
algorithms in adversarial environments. In these adversarial environments, we are facing
more severe situations than those addressed in the classic robust statistical inference
problems. One such scenario is where an adversary can observe the whole dataset and
then devise its attack vector to modify all entries in the data point hoping to cause the
maximum inference error or to control the inference results. For example, the adver-
sarial example phenomenon in the deep neural network (Pimentel-Alarcon et al., 2017;
Szegedy et al., 2013; Nguyen et al., 2015; Goodfellow et al., 2015; Carlini and Wagner,
2017) where an adversary can observe the whole picture and then carefully modify the
pixels in the picture with the goal of fooling the classifier. As another example, it was
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shown in (Jagielski et al., 2018) that an adversary can modify the training data so that
the model produced by the linear regression is controlled by the adversary. The existence
of such powerful adversaries calls for new models and methodologies for adversarially
robust inference.
In a canonical statistical inference problem, one infers parameters of interest from given
data points {x1, · · · ,xN}. The classic robust inference mainly deals with distributional
robustness, i.e., the shape of the true underlying distribution deviates from the assumed
model (Huber, 1964; Huber and Ronchetti, 2009; Hampel et al., 2009). More specifically,
let Fθ be the cumulative density function (CDF) of the assumed model with θ being
parameter, then the classic robust inference deals with the situation where the data
points xn are independently and identically generated by an unknown CDF F in the η-
neighborhood Pη(Fθ) of the assumed model Fθ. The goal of the classic robust inference
is to design inference algorithms that perform well for any F ∈ Pη(Fθ). For example,
Pη(Fθ) can be a Le´vy neighborhood Pη(Fθ) = {F |∀t, Fθ(t − η) ≤ F (t) ≤ Fθ(t +
η) + η} or contamination neighborhood Pη(Fθ) = {F |(1− η)Fθ + ηH} in which H can
be any probability measure. The contamination neighborhood model can be viewed as
having η fraction of the data as outliers, while the Le´vy neighborhood (or other related
neighborhood) is useful in scenarios with model uncertainties. Various concepts such as
influence function (IF), breakdown point, and change of variance etc were developed to
quantify the robustness of estimators against the presence of outliers.
In this paper, we consider a setup with more powerful adversaries than those considered
in the classic robust inference and investigate adversarial robustness. In particular, in the
considered setup, after data points {x1, · · · ,xN} are generated, the adversary can observe
the whole dataset and then modify all data points to {x1+∆x1, · · · ,xN +∆xN} where
each ∆xn is carefully designed and depends on the whole data set. It is easy to see that
the adversary in the adversarially robust model is more powerful. In particular, for any
F ∈ Pη(Fθ) in the classic model, the adversary in the adverarially robust model can
mimic the behavior of F by simply replacing the dataset with i.i.d samples generated
from F . Clearly, this is not optimal strategy that the adversary in our model will adopt, as
the adversary is not limited to this type of i.i.d attacks after observing the whole dataset.
It can construct correlated attack signals that are based on the whole dataset. As the
result, it is important to understand the following questions: 1) What is the attacker’s
optimal attack strategy in choosing ∆x?; 2) What are the impacts of these attacks?; 3)
How shall we design inference algorithms to minimize the impact?
In our recent work (Lai and Bayraktar, 2018), we made some progress in addressing
these problems for the case of scalar parameter estimation, in which the parameter to be
estimated is a scalar and each sample xn is also a scalar. In particular, given a data set x =
{x1, · · · , xN} with xn being i.i.d realizations of random variable X that has CDF Fθ(x)
with unknown scalar parameter θ, we would like to estimate the unknown parameter θ.
There is an adversary who can observe the whole dataset and can modify the dataset to
x∆ = x+∆x := {x1+∆x1, · · · , xN+∆xN}, in which ∆x = {∆x1, · · · ,∆xN} is the attack
vector chosen by the adversary after observing x. Certain restrictions need to be put on
∆x, otherwise the estimation problem will not be meaningful. In (Lai and Bayraktar,
2018), we assume that ∆x ∈ Pη := { 1N ||∆x||pp ≤ δp}, in which || · ||p is the ℓp norm. This
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type of constraints are reasonable and are motivated by real life examples. For example, in
generating adversary examples in images (Pimentel-Alarcon et al., 2017; Szegedy et al.,
2013; Nguyen et al., 2015; Goodfellow et al., 2015; Carlini and Wagner, 2017), the total
distortion should be limited, otherwise human eyes will be able to detect such changes.
The classic setup with contamination model (Huber, 1964; Huber and Ronchetti, 2009;
Hampel et al., 2009) can be viewed as a special case of our formulation by letting p →
0, i.e., the classic setup has a constraint on the total number of data points that the
attacker can modify. For a given estimator, we would like to characterize how sensitive
the estimator is with respect to the adversarial attack. In (Lai and Bayraktar, 2018), we
considered a scenario where the goal of the attacker is to maximize the estimation error
caused by the attack. We introduced a concept named “adversarial influence function”
(AIF) to quantify the asymptotic rate at which the attacker can introduce estimation
error through its optimal attack. From the defender’s perspective, the smaller AIF is,
the more adversarially robust the estimator is. In (Lai and Bayraktar, 2018), building
on the characterization of AIF, we characterized the optimal estimator, among a certain
class of estimators, that minimizes AIF. From this characterization, we show that there
is a tradeoff between the robustness against adversarial attacks and robustness against
outliers. In (Lai and Bayraktar, 2018), we further designed optimal estimator that achieve
the optimal tradeoff among these quantities for the scalar case.
In this paper, we extend our work in (Lai and Bayraktar, 2018) to multivariate setup,
in which the goal is to jointly estimate multiple parameters from vector observations.
The multivariate setup includes many important cases such as the joint location-scale
estimation and robust linear regression etc. In this multivariate setup, we have N data
points {xn, n = 1, · · · , N} with each data point xn ∈ Rm being a vector. These data
points are realizations of a random variable that has CDF Fθ(x) with unknown parameter
vector θ ∈ Rq. We use m×N matrix X := [x1, · · · ,xN ] to denote the given data matrix.
From this given data set, we would like to estimate the unknown parameter θ. The
adversary will modify the data to X∆ = X + ∆X, in which ∆X is the attack matrix
chosen by the adversary after observing X. Similar to the situation in the classic robust
inference problem (Hubert et al., 2008), the multivariate adversarial robustness setup is
significantly more challenging than the scalar case.
Firstly, the characterization of the optimal attack strategy is much more difficult.
There are many more degrees of freedom for the attacker to choose from, as the dimension
of ∆X is m × N . Furthermore, each modification will affect all q components of the
estimated vector θˆ in a different but coupled manner. In this paper, we focus on the
class of M -estimators specified by q-dimension functions ψ. For this class of estimators,
we characterize the optimal attack vector ∆X and the corresponding AIF. We further
simplify this general formula for robust linear regression and evaluate the adversarial
robustness of various existing robust algorithms.
Secondly, the characterization of the optimal defense strategy is also much harder.
For example, in the M -estimator case, now ψ is a q-dimension function, and the corre-
sponding optimization problem of maximizing AIF becomes a coupled multi-dimension
calculus of variation problem, which is in general very challenging. In this paper, for the
important case of joint location-scale estimation problem, we show that we can decouple
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the characterization of optimal defense problem into two scalar problems. Building on
this, we identify the optimal M -estimator that minimizes AIF. In addition, similar to
the scalar problem, we show that there exist a tradeoff between the robustness against
adversarial attack and robustness again outliers. We further characterize the optimal
M -estimator that achieves the optimal tradeoff between these robustness metrics.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the
considered model. In Section 3, we derive general AIF results and simplify the results
for robust linear regression problems. In Section 4, we focus on the special case of joint
location-scale estimation problem and characterize the optimal estimators that achieve
the optimal AIF for both cases with and without constraints on the robustness against
outliers. In Section 5, we use several numerical examples to illustrate results derived in
this paper. Section 6 provides concluding remarks.
2. Model
In this section, we first introduce our problem formulation. We will then briefly review
results from classic robust estimation that are directly related to our study.
2.1. Problem Formulation
We have N data points {xn, n = 1, · · · , N} with xn := [xn,1, · · · ,xn,m]T ∈ Rm. These
data points are i.i.d realizations of a random variable that has CDF Fθ(x) with unknown
parameter θ ∈ Θ ⊂ Rq. Here, Θ is a compact set. We will use fθ(x) to denote the
corresponding probability density function (pdf). We usem×N matrixX := [x1, · · · ,xN ]
to denote the given data matrix. From this given data set, we would like to estimate
the unknown parameter θ. However, as the adversary has access to the whole dataset,
it will modify the data to X∆ = X + ∆X := [x1 + ∆x1, · · · ,xN + ∆xN ], in which
∆X := [∆x1, · · · ,∆xN ] is the attack matrix chosen by the adversary after observing X.
We will discuss the attacker’s optimal attack strategy in choosing ∆X in the sequel. In
this work, we consider the case where the attacker can modify all data points, which is a
more suitable setup for recent data analytical applications. However, certain restrictions
need to be put on ∆X, otherwise the estimation problem will not be meaningful. In this
paper, we assume that
1
mN
||∆X||pp ≤ δp, (2.1)
in which ||A||p is the entry-wise matrix p-norm:
||A||p = ||Vec(A)||p =
(∑∑
|Ai,j |p
)1/p
,
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with Vec(A) being the vectorization of matrixA. In (2.1), we have the normalization term
1
mN as the matrix ∆X is of size m×N . The normalization factor implies that the per-
dimension change (on average) is upper-bound by δp. As mentioned in the introduction,
this type of constraints are reasonable and are motivated by real life examples.
Following notation used in robust statistics (Huber and Ronchetti, 2009; Hampel et al.,
2009), we will use tN (X), a q dimensional vector, to denote an estimator. For a given
estimator tN , we would like to characterize how sensitive the estimator is with respect to
the adversarial attack. In this paper, we consider a scenario where the goal of the attacker
is to maximize the estimation error caused by the attack. In particular, the attacker aims
to choose ∆X by solving the following optimization problem
max
∆X
||tN (X+∆X)− tN (X)||1, (2.2)
s.t.
1
mN
||∆X||pp ≤ δp,
in which || · ||1 is the ℓ1 norm.
We use f(tN ,X, p, δ) to denote the optimal value obtained from the optimization
problem (2.2), and define the adversarial influence function (AIF) of estimator tN at X
under ℓp norm constraint as
AIF(tN ,X, p) = lim
δ↓0
f(tN ,X, p, δ)
δ
.
This quantity, a generalization of the concept of influence function (IF) used in classic
robust estimation (a brief review of IF will be provided in Section 2.2), quantifies the
asymptotic rate at which the attacker can introduce estimation error through its attack.
From the defender’s perspective, the smaller AIF is, the more robust the estimator
is. In this paper, building on the characterization of AIF(tN ,X, p), we will character-
ize the optimal estimator tN , among a certain class of estimators T , that minimizes
AIF(tN ,X, p). In particular, we will investigate
min
tN∈T
AIF(tN ,X, p).
Note that AIF(tN ,X, p) depends on the data matrix X. Based on the characterization
of AIF for a given data realization matrix X with N columns (each column representing
one data point), we will then study the population version of AIF where each column of
X is i.i.d generated by Fθ. We will examine the behavior of AIF(tN ,X, p) as N increases.
We will see that for a large class of estimators AIF(tN ,X, p) has a well-defined limit as
N →∞. We will use AIF(t, Fθ, p) to denote this limit when it exists.
From the defense’s perspective, we would like to design an estimator that is least
sensitive to the adversarial attack. Again, we will characterize the optimal estimator t,
among a certain class of estimators T , that minimizes AIF(t, Fθ, p). That is, for a certain
class of estimators T , we will solve
min
t∈T
AIF(t, Fθ, p). (2.3)
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It will be clear in the sequel that the solution to the optimization problem (2.3), even
though is robust against adversarial attacks, has poor performance in guarding against
outliers. This motivates us to design estimators that strike a desirable tradeoff between
these two robustness measures. In particular, we will solve (2.3) with an additional con-
straint on IF. After the corresponding quantities are introduced in later sections, precise
formulation of this optimization problem with additional IF constraint will be given
in (4.7).
2.2. M-Estimator and Influence Function (IF)
In this paper, we will mainly focus on a class of commonly used estimator in robust
statistic: M -estimator (Huber, 1964), in which one obtains an estimate tN (X) of θ by
solving
N∑
n=1
ψ(xn, tN ) = 0. (2.4)
Here ψ(x, θ) : Rm×Rq → Rq is a vector function of data point x and parameter θ to
be estimated. We use ψi, i = 1, · · · , q, to denote each component of ψ. Different choices
of ψ lead to different robust estimators. For example, the most likely estimator (MLE)
can be obtained by setting ψ = −f ′
θ
/fθ.
As the form of ψ determines tN , in the remainder of the paper, we will use ψ and tN
interchangeably. For example, we will denote AIF(tN ,X, p) as AIF(ψ,X, p).
It is typically assumed that ψ(x, θ) is continuous and almost everywhere differentiable.
This assumption is valid for all ψ’s that are commonly used. It is also typically required
that the estimator is Fisher consistent (Hampel et al., 2009):
EFθ [ψ(X, θ)] = 0, (2.5)
in which EFθ means expectation under Fθ. Intuitively speaking, this implies that the
true parameter θ is the solution of the M -estimator if there are increasingly more i.i.d.
data points generated from Fθ.
In the contamination model of the classic robust estimation setup, it is assumed that
a fraction δ of data points are outliers, while the remainder of data points are generated
from the true distribution Fθ. For a given estimator t, the concept of IF introduced by
Hamper (Hampel, 1968) is defined
IF(x, t, Fθ) = lim
δ↓0
t((1 − δ)Fθ + δix)− t(Fθ)
δ
.
Here, IF(x, t, Fθ) is a q dimensional vector. In this definition, ix is a distribution that
puts mass 1 at point x. In addition, t(Fθ) is the obtained estimate when all data points
are generated i.i.d from Fθ, and t((1 − δ)Fθ + δix) is the obtained estimate when 1− δ
fraction of data points are generated i.i.d from Fθ while δ fraction of the data points are
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at x. Hence, IF(x, t, Fθ) measures the asymptotic influence of having outliers at point x
as δ ↓ 0. Similar as above, as t is determined by ψ in M-estimator, in the following, we
will also denote IF(x, t, Fθ) as IF(x,ψ, Fθ).
Furthermore, to characterize the impact of the worst outliers, Hamper (Hampel et al.,
2009) introduced the (unstandardized) gross-error sensitivity:
γ∗u(ψ, Fθ) = sup
x
{||IF(x,ψ, Fθ)||2}, (2.6)
in which || · ||2 is the ℓ2 norm.
For M -estimator, IF(x,ψ, Fθ) was shown to be (Hampel et al., 2009)
IF(x,ψ, Fθ) =M(ψ, Fθ)
−1ψ(x, t(Fθ)),
with the q × q matrix M given by
M(ψ, Fθ) = −
∫
∂
∂θ
ψ(x, θ)
∣∣∣∣
t(Fθ)
dFθ(x),
see (4.2.9) of (Hampel et al., 2009).
3. Characterizing AIF
In this section, for a given data matrix X, we analyze the AIF for any given M-estimator
ψ as specified in (2.4). As ψ is q-dimension vector, there are q equations. To simplify the
presentation, we write each equation as
Gi(X, tN ) :=
N∑
n=1
ψi(xn, tN ) = 0, i = 1, · · · , q
and denote G = [G1, · · · , Gq]T . Using this notation, (2.4) can be written as
G(X, tN ) = 0. (3.1)
3.1. General Case
To proceed further, we write
G
′
θ
(X, tN ) =
∂G
∂θ
∣∣∣∣
X,tN
,
G
′
X
(X, tN ) =
∂G
∂Vec(X)
∣∣∣∣
X,tN
,
and
t
′
N (X) =
∂tN
∂Vec(X)
∣∣∣∣
X,tN
.
We have the following characterization.
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Theorem 3.1. For p ≥ 1, suppose G′
θ
(X, tN ) is invertible, we have
AIF(ψ,X, p) = (mN)1/pmax
σ∈Σ
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣σT [G′θ(X, tN )]−1G′X(X, tN )
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
p
p−1
, (3.2)
in which Σ is the set of length q vectors with each entry being either 1 or −1.
Proof. First, from (3.1), we have
t
′
N (X) = −
[
G
′
θ(X, tN )
]−1
G
′
X(X, tN ). (3.3)
Using Taylor expansion, we have
tN (X+∆X)− tN (X) = t
′
N (X)Vec(∆X) + higher order terms.
When δ is small, the adversary can focus on the following optimization problem to
obtain an o(δ) optimal solution
(P1): max
Vec(∆X)
||t′N (X)Vec(∆X)||1, (3.4)
s.t. ||∆X||pp ≤ Nmδp.
Let f∗ be the optimal value obtained in the optimization problem (P1). Let g∗ be the
optimal value of the following optimization problem
(P2): max
σ∈Σ
max
Vec(∆X)
σT t
′
N (X)Vec(∆X),
s.t. ||∆X||pp ≤ Nmδp.
In Appendix A, we show that f∗ = g∗. Hence, we can focus on problem (P2).
The inner maximization problem in (P2) is the same as
min
∆X
−σT t′N (X)Vec(∆X),
s.t. ||∆X||pp ≤ Nmδp.
Using (3.3), we have
−σT t′N (X)Vec(∆X) = σT
[
G
′
θ
(X, tN )
]−1
G
′
X
(X, tN )Vec(∆X).
To simplify the notation, we denote
a = σT
[
G
′
θ(X, tN )
]−1
G
′
X(X, tN ),
which is a row vector with mN entries. Even though a is only a row vector, we denote
these elements as ai,j for i = 1, · · · ,m and j = 1, · · · , N to better connect with each
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elements of ∆X. Hence, ai,j corresponds to ∆Xi,j . Using this notation, the optimization
problem can be written as
min
∆X
aVec(∆X),
s.t. ||∆X||pp ≤ mNδp.
For p = 1, this is a linear programing problem, whose solution is simple. In particular,
let a∗ = max
i,j
|ai,j |, and (i∗, j∗) be the corresponding index, it is easy to check that we
have
∆X∗i∗,j∗ = −sign {ai∗,j∗}mNδ,
and ∆X∗i,j = 0 for other i, js. Hence,
AIF(ψ,X, p) = max
σ∈Σ
mNa∗ = mN max
σ∈Σ
||a||∞.
For p > 1, (3.5) is a convex optimization problem. To solve this, we form Lagrange
L(∆X, λ) = aVec(∆X) + λ (||∆X||pp −mNδp) .
The corresponding optimality conditions are:
ai,j + λ
∗psign(∆X∗i,j)|∆X∗i,j |p−1 = 0, ∀n (3.5)
λ∗ ≥ 0,
λ∗
(||∆X||pp −mNδp) = 0.
From (3.5), we know that λ∗ 6= 0, hence
||∆X∗||pp = mNδp, (3.6)
and
sign(∆X∗i,j)|∆X∗i,j |p−1 =
−ai,j
λ∗p
. (3.7)
From (3.7) and the fact that λ∗p is positive, we know sign(∆X∗i,j) = −sign(ai,j), and
hence we have
|∆X∗i,j |p−1 =
|ai,j |
λ∗p
,
which can be simplified further to
∆X∗i,j = −
( |ai,j |
λ∗p
)1/(p−1)
sign(ai,j).
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Combining these with (3.6), we obtain the value of λ∗:
λ∗ =
1
p


N∑
n=1
|ai,j |p/(p−1)
mNδp


(p−1)/p
.
As the result, we have
∆X∗i,j = −
|ai,j|1/(p−1)(mN)1/p
(
∑ |ai,j |p/(p−1))1/p sign(ai,j)δ.
Hence, the optimal value of the inner maximization of (P2) is
∑
i,j
ai,j
|ai,j |1/(p−1)(mN)1/p
(
∑ |ai,j |p/(p−1))1/p sign(ai,j) = (mN)1/p||a||p/(p−1),
which finishes the proof.
By setting m = 1 and q = 1, (3.2) recovers the result on the scalar case presented
in (Lai and Bayraktar, 2018).
3.2. Robust Regression
In this section, we use robust linear regression, an important multivariate parameter
estimation problem, as an example to illustrate the result derived in Section 3.1. In linear
regression problems, the data points are x˜n =
(
xn
yn
)
, n = 1, · · · , N with xn ∈ Rq and
yn ∈ R. Hence, x˜n ∈ Rq+1. In the following, we let X˜ = [x˜1, · · · , x˜N ] ∈ R(q+1)×N , and
still denote X = [x1, · · · ,xN ] ∈ Rq×N . From the data, we would like to fit a linear model,
i.e., we would like to find θ = [θ1, · · · , θq]T ∈ Rq such that xTnθ is a good approximation
of yn. Hence, the parameters to be estimated are θ ∈ Rq. Furthermore, each data point
x˜n ∈ Rq+1, hence m = q + 1. We denote
rn = yn − xTnθ
as the residual error.
The commonly used ordinary least square (OLS) approach finds θ by solving
min
θ
N∑
n=1
r2n,
which is equivalent to solving
N∑
n=1
rnxn = 0. (3.8)
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The solution is well known θˆOLS = (XX
T )−1Xy. In the subsequent discussion, we will
use a related quantity named hat matrix
H = XT (XXT )−1X. (3.9)
It is known that OLS solution is not robust to outliers (Hampel et al., 2009). Vari-
ous robust linear regression schemes were proposed (Wilcox, 2005; Mallows, 1975; Huber,
1973; Merrill and Schweppe, 1971). They generally setψ(x˜n, tN ) in the form η(rnvn)wnxn
with function η : R → R and weights wn and vn. That is, for robust linear regression,
one obtains the estimate tN of θ by solving
N∑
n=1
ψ(x˜n, tN ) =
N∑
n=1
η(rnvn)wnxn = 0. (3.10)
The weights wn and vn can be chosen to not only depend on xn but also the whole
data matrix X. For example, it is common (Wilcox, 2005; Mallows, 1975) to use wn =√
1− hnn, in which hnn = xTn (XXT )−1xn is the nth diagonal element of the hat ma-
trix (3.9). It is known (Huber and Ronchetti, 2009) that 0 ≤ hnn ≤ 1. Comparing (3.10)
with (3.8), we can see that one replaces xn in (3.8) with wnxn and replaces rn in (3.8)
with η(rnvn). The main idea is to use wn to limit the impact of outliers in xn and use
η(rnvn) to limit the impact of outliers in the residual rn while taking the location of xn
into consideration. From (3.10), we have
ψi(x˜n, tN ) = η(rnvn)wnxn,i = η((yn − xTn tN )vn)wnxn,i,
Gi(X˜, tN ) =
N∑
n=1
ψi(x˜n, tN ) =
N∑
n=1
η((yn − xTntN )vn)wnxn,i.
Different choices of functions lead to different classes of robust linear regression meth-
ods. For example:
• wn = 1, vn = 1 leads to Huber’s proposal (Huber, 1973), in which the idea was to
replace rn in (3.8) with η(rn) so as to limit the influence of large residuals (similar
to the M-estimator in a single variable case).
• vn = 1 leads to Mallows’s proposal.
• vn = 1/wn is Schewppe’s approach (Merrill and Schweppe, 1971).
In the following, we calculate G
′
X˜
(X˜, tN ) and G
′
θ
(X˜, tN ).
First, we compute G
′
X˜
(X˜, tN ). For i = 1, · · · , q; j = 1, · · · , N ; and k = 1, · · · , q, we
have
∂Gi
∂xj,k
∣∣∣∣
X˜,tN
=
∂
(
N∑
n=1
wnη(rnvn)xn,i
)
∂xj,k
=
N∑
n=1
[
η(rnvn)xn,i
∂wn
∂xj,k
+ wnxn,iη
′
(rnvn)
(
−tN (k)vnI(j = n) + rn ∂vn
∂xj,k
)
+wnη(rnvn)I(j = n, k = i)] ,
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in which I(·) is the indicator function and tN (k) is the kth element of t. In addition,
∂Gi
∂yj
∣∣∣∣
X˜,tN
= wjη
′
(rjvj)vjxj,i := cjxj,i,
in which we denote
cj = wjη
′
(rjvj)vj . (3.11)
Furthermore, each entry of G
′
θ
(X˜, tN ) can be computed as
∂Gi
∂θj
∣∣∣∣
X˜,tN
= −
N∑
n=1
wnη
′
(rnvn)vnxn,ixn,j := −
N∑
n=1
cnxn,ixn,j .
From this, we know that
G
′
θ
(X˜, tN ) = −Xdiag[c1, · · · , cN ]XT .
Using the result in Theorem 3.1, assuming G
′
θ
(X˜, tN ) is invertible, we have the fol-
lowing characterization of AIF of robust linear regression.
Proposition 3.1. For robust linear regression,
AIF(ψ, X˜, p) = (mN)1/pmax
σ∈Σ
∣∣∣∣∣∣σT [Xdiag[c1, · · · , cN ]XT ]−1G′
X˜
(X˜, tN )
∣∣∣∣∣∣
p
p−1
,
with cj defined in (3.11).
We now apply Proposition 3.1 to various specific (robust) linear regression approaches.
Example 3.1. OLS: For OLS, we have wn = 1, vn = 1 and η(r) = r. In this case, we
have
∂Gi
∂xj,k
∣∣∣∣
X˜,tN
= −xj,itN (k) + rjI(k = i),
and ∂Gi∂yj
∣∣∣
X˜,tN
= xj,i. Furthermore, cj = 1 and hence G
′
θ
(X, tN ) = −XXT .
Example 3.2. Huber’s proposal (Huber, 1973): In Huber’s proposal (Huber,
1973), we have wn = 1, vn = 1. In this case, we have
∂Gi
∂xj,k
∣∣∣∣
X˜,tN
= −xj,itN (k)η
′
(rj) + η(rj)I(k = i),
and ∂Gi∂yj
∣∣∣
X˜,tN
= η
′
(rj)xj,i. Furthermore G
′
θ
(X, tN ) = −Xdiag[η′(r1), · · · , η′(rN )]XT .
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Example 3.3. Mallow’s proposal: In Mallow’s proposal, we have vn = 1. In this
case, we have
∂Gi
∂xj,k
∣∣∣∣
X˜,tN
=
N∑
n=1
[
η(rn)xn,i
∂wn
∂xj,k
]
− wjxj,itN (k)η
′
(rj) + wjη(rj)I(k = i),
and ∂Gi∂yj
∣∣∣
X˜,tN
= wjη
′
(rj)xj,i. Furthermore, G
′
θ
(X, tN ) = −Xdiag[c1, · · · , cN ]XT with
cj = wjη
′
(rj).
Example 3.4. Schewppe’s approach (Merrill and Schweppe, 1971): In Schew-
ppe’s approach, we have vn = 1/wn. In this case, we have
∂Gi
∂xj,k
∣∣∣∣
X˜,tN
=
N∑
n=1
[
η(rnvn)xn,i
∂wn
∂xj,k
− wnxn,iη
′
(rnvn)
(
tN (k)vnI(j = n) +
rn
w2n
∂wn
∂xj,k
)
+wnη(rnvn)I(j = n, k = i)] .
and ∂Gi∂yj
∣∣∣
X˜,tN
= η
′
(rjvj)xj,i. Furthermore, cj = η
′
(rjvj) andG
′
θ
(X, tN ) = −Xdiag[c1, · · · , cN ]XT .
We will compare these methods numerically in Section 5.
4. Optimal Adversarial Robustness vs Outlier
Robustness Tradeoff
In this section, we specialize the results to the joint estimation of location and scale.
Building on these results, we will designM -estimators that minimizes AIF or achieves the
optimal tradeoff between AIF, i.e., adversarial robustness, and IF, i.e., outlier robustness.
In the joint location-scale estimation, given {xn, n = 1, · · · , N} with xn ∈ R, the goal
is to jointly estimate the location parameter θ1 and the scale parameter θ2. We will that
assume θ1 is bounded and there is a constant c such that |θ2| > c. Hence, the dimension
of each data point m = 1 and the dimension of parameter q = 2. We focus on a large
class of model named the location-scale model (Hampel et al., 2009). In the location-scale
model, we have
Fθ(X) = L (θ1 + θ2Z),
in which Z is a random variable with symmetric pdf f0 and CDF F0, and L (θ1 + θ2Z)
means the distribution of θ1+ θ2Z. This class of model includes many important models
in statistics. For example the joint estimation of mean and variance of Gaussian ran-
dom variable belongs to this model. Another important example is the linear regression
discussed in Section 3.2.
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Following the convention, we use TN to denote the estimation of location θ1 and SN to
denote the estimation of the scale θ2. In the location-scale model, one typically obtains
(TN , SN ) by solving the following equations (Huber and Ronchetti, 2009):
N∑
n=1
ψ1
(
xn − TN
SN
)
= 0,
N∑
n=1
ψ2
(
xn − TN
SN
)
= 0,
with properly chosen ψ1 and ψ2. In the following, for presentation and notation conve-
nience, we denote
zn :=
xn − TN
SN
.
Hence,
ψ(x, θ) =
(
ψ1 (z)
ψ2 (z)
)
,
with z = x−θ1θ2 .
For this class of model, one typically focuses on equivariantM -estimator (Hampel et al.,
2009) with
ψ1(−z) = −ψ1(z) and ψ2(−z) = ψ2(z).
This implies that the first component of ψ is an odd function, while the second component
of ψ is an even function. Furthermore, ψ1 and ψ2 are assumed to be monotone functions
in z ≥ 0. Without loss of generality, we will focus on monotone increasing functions,
hence ψ
′
1(z) ≥ 0 and ψ
′
2(z) ≥ 0 for z ≥ 0.
4.1. Given Sample Case
We first use the results derived in Section 3 to characterize the AIF for a given data
matrix X. We note that in this joint location-scale estimation problem, m = 1, q = 2,
and
Gi =
N∑
n=1
ψi(zn).
We have
∂Gi
∂xn
∣∣∣∣
X,tN
=
1
SN
ψ
′
i(zn),
∂Gi
∂θ1
∣∣∣∣
X,tN
= − 1
SN
N∑
n=1
ψ
′
i(zn),
∂Gi
∂θ2
∣∣∣∣
X,tN
= − 1
SN
N∑
n=1
znψ
′
i(zn).
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Hence,
G
′
X(X, tN ) =
1
SN
[
ψ
′
1(z1), , · · · , ψ
′
1(zN )
ψ
′
2(z1), · · · , ψ
′
2(zN )
]
,
G
′
θ
(X, tN ) = − 1
SN


N∑
n=1
ψ
′
1(zn),
N∑
n=1
znψ
′
1(zn)
N∑
n=1
ψ
′
2(zn),
N∑
n=1
znψ
′
2(zn)

 := − 1SN
[
a, b
c, d
]
. (4.1)
Since, q = 2, Σ = {(1, 1)T , (−1,−1)T , (1,−1)T , (−1, 1)T}. Due to symmetry, we only
need to consider σ being either (1, 1)T or (1,−1)T . When σ ∈ {(1, 1)T , (1,−1)T}, we
have
σT
[
G
′
θ(X, tN )
]−1
G
′
X(X, tN )
= −
[
(d− σ(2)c)ψ′1(z1) + (σ(2)a− b)ψ
′
2(z1), · · · , (d− σ(2)c)ψ
′
1(zN ) + (σ(2)a− b)ψ
′
2(zN)
]
ad− bc .
Hence, using Theorem 3.1, for p > 1, we have
AIF(ψ,X, p)
= max
σ
N1/p
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣σT [G′θ(X, tN )]−1G′X(X, tN )
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
p
p−1
=
N1/p
|ad− bc| maxσ(2)∈{1,−1}
[
N∑
n=1
∣∣∣(d− σ(2)c)ψ′1(zn) + (σ(2)a− b)ψ′2(zn)∣∣∣p/(p−1)
](p−1)/p
=
N
|ad− bc| maxσ(2)∈{1,−1}
[
1
N
N∑
n=1
∣∣∣(d− σ(2)c)ψ′1(zn) + (σ(2)a− b)ψ′2(zn)∣∣∣p/(p−1)
](p−1)/p
≥ N|ad− bc| maxσ(2)∈{1,−1}
1
N
N∑
n=1
|(d− σ(2)c)ψ′1(zn) + (σ(2)a− b)ψ
′
2(zn)|
≥ 1|ad− bc| maxσ(2)∈{1,−1}
∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
n=1
(
(d− σ(2)c)ψ′1(zn) + (σ(2)a− b)ψ
′
2(zn)
)∣∣∣∣∣
= 1.
Summarizing the discussion, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1. For joint location-scale estimation,
AIF(ψ,X, p) =
N1/p
|ad− bc| maxσ(2)∈{1,−1}
[
N∑
n=1
∣∣∣(d− σ(2)c)ψ′1(zn) + (σ(2)a− b)ψ′2(zn)∣∣∣p/(p−1)
](p−1)/p
.
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Furthermore, we have
AIF(ψ,X, p) ≥ 1.
In the following, we provide several examples to analyze AIF of existing schemes.
Example 4.1. The coupled mean and sample standard deviation estimator (page 233
of (Hampel et al., 2009)) is specified by ψ1(z) = z and ψ2(z) = z
2−1. For this estimator,
we have ψ
′
1(zn) = 1, ψ
′
2(zn) = 2zn, and
N∑
n=1
zn = 0, and
N∑
n=1
(z2n − 1) = 0.
As the result,
a =
N∑
n=1
ψ
′
1(zn) = N,
b =
N∑
n=1
znψ
′
1(zn) =
N∑
n=1
zn = 0,
c =
N∑
n=1
ψ
′
2(zn) =
N∑
n=1
2zn = 0,
d =
N∑
n=1
znψ
′
2(zn) =
N∑
n=1
2z2n = 2N.
Hence,
AIF(ψ,X, p) =
N1/p
|ad− bc| maxσ(2)∈{1,−1}
[
N∑
n=1
∣∣∣(d− σ(2)c)ψ′1(zn) + (σ(2)a− b)ψ′2(zn)∣∣∣p/(p−1)
](p−1)/p
=
N1/p
2N2
max
σ(2)∈{1,−1}
[
N∑
n=1
|2N + 2Nσ(2)zn|p/(p−1)
](p−1)/p
= max
σ(2)∈{1,−1}
[
1
N
N∑
n=1
|1 + σ(2)zn|p/(p−1)
](p−1)/p
.
In particular, when p = 2, we have
AIF(ψ,X, 2) = max
σ(2)∈{1,−1}
[
1
N
N∑
n=1
(1 + σ(2)zn)
2
]1/2
=
√
2.
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Example 4.2. Combination of the asymptotic minimax estimates of location and scale:
ψ1(z) = max[−K,min(K, z)], and ψ2(z) = min(α2, z2)− β,
where 0 < β < α2. The parameters K,α and β are properly chosen so that the corre-
sponding location and scale estimators are minimax estimators respectively. If one further
sets α = K, this estimator corresponds to Huber’s Proposal 2 (Huber, 1964). For this
joint estimator, we have
N∑
n=1
ψ1(zn) =
∑
n∈A−:={zn≤−K}
−K +
∑
n∈A:={|zn|<K}
zn +
∑
n∈A+:={zn≥K}
K = 0,
N∑
n=1
ψ2(zn) =
∑
n∈B:={z2n≤c
2}
(z2n − β) +
∑
n∈B¯
(α2 − β) = 0,
ψ
′
1(zn) = I(n ∈ A) and ψ
′
2(zn) = 2znI(n ∈ B).
As the result,
a =
N∑
n=1
ψ
′
1(zn) = |A|,
b =
N∑
n=1
znψ
′
1(zn) =
∑
n∈A
zn = K[|A−| − |A+|],
c =
N∑
n=1
ψ
′
2(zn) = 2
∑
n∈B
zn,
d =
N∑
n=1
znψ
′
2(zn) =
∑
n∈B
2z2n = 2(Nβ − |B¯|c2).
Plugging these into Proposition 4.1, we can obtain the formulator for AIF.
In Section 4.2, we will see that these existing schemes are not optimal in terms of
minimizing AIF with or without additional IF constraints. We will derive optimal schemes
that minimizes AIF with or without IF constraint in Section 4.2.
4.2. Population Case
In this section, we analyze the behavior of AIF as N → ∞. Based on this analysis, we
will characterize the optimal ψ that minimizes AIF. We will further identify a tradeoff
between AIF and IF, and design ψ that achieves this optimal tradeoff.
imsart-bj ver. 2014/10/16 file: bj-robustrl.tex date: March 28, 2019
18 E. Bayraktar and L. Lai
Using Proposition 4.1, we have
AIF(ψ,X, 2)
=
N
|ad− bc| maxσ(2)∈{1,−1}
[
1
N
N∑
n=1
∣∣∣(d− σ(2)c)ψ′1(zn) + (σ(2)a− b)ψ′2(zn)∣∣∣2
]1/2
=
1
|a˜d˜− b˜c˜| maxσ(2)∈{1,−1}


N∑
n=1
(
(d˜− c˜)2ψ′1(zn)2 + 2(a˜− b˜)((d˜ − c˜))ψ
′
1(zn)ψ
′
2(zn) + (a˜− b˜)2ψ
′
2(zn)
2
)
N


1/2
,(4.2)
in which a˜ = σ(2)a/N, b˜ = b/N, c˜ = σ(2)c/N, d˜ = d/N .
It has been shown in Theorem 2.4 of (Huber and Ronchetti, 2009) that, under certain
mild regularity conditions, TN
a.s.→ θ1 and SN a.s.→ θ2. In the following, we will need the
following additional regularity conditions:
• ψ′1(z) and ψ
′
2(z) are continuous functions.
• There exist a function K(z) such that |ψ′1(z)| ≤ K(z), |zψ
′
1(z)| ≤ K(z), |ψ
′
2(z)| ≤
K(z), |zψ′2(z)| ≤ K(z), and E[K(Z)] <∞.
Recall that the CDF of Z is F0, hence E{·} here (and the subsequent discussion) denotes
expectation under F0. The conditions here are slightly stronger than those conditions
needed for the strong law of large numbers, as we will need to use the uniform strong law
of large numbers (see Theorem 16 (a) (Ferguson, 1996)). Under these regularity assump-
tions, using the uniform strong law of large numbers, Slutsky Theorem (see Chapter 6
of (Ferguson, 1996)) and the fact that TN
a.s.→ θ1 and SN a.s.→ θ2, we have
a˜ = σ(2)a/N
a.s.→ σ(2)E{ψ′1(Z)},
d˜ = d/N
a.s.→ E{Zψ′2(Z)}.
Furthermore,
b˜ = b/N
a.s.→ E{Zψ′1(Z)} = 0,
as ψ
′
1(z) is an even function (since ψ1(z) is an odd function) and f0 is symmetric. Simi-
larly, c˜ = σ(2)c/N
a.s.→ E{ψ′2(Z)} = 0 since ψ2(Z) is an even function.
As a result,
AIF(ψ,X, 2)
a.s.→
√
E{ψ′1(Z)2}
(E{ψ′1(Z)})2
+
E{ψ′2(Z)2}
(E{Zψ′2(Z)})2
:= AIF(ψ, F0, 2). (4.3)
In deriving this equation, we use the fact that ψ
′
1(Z)ψ
′
2(Z) is an odd function, hence
1
N
N∑
n=1
ψ
′
1(zn)ψ
′
2(zn)
a.s.→ E{ψ′1(Z)ψ
′
2(Z)} = 0.
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4.2.1. Minimizing AIF(ψ, F0, 2)
From the defender’s perspective, one would like to design ψ such that AIF(ψ, F0, 2)
is small. We now characterize ψ1 and ψ2 that minimize AIF(ψ, F0, 2). As (4.3) can be
decomposed into two independent terms, we can minimize ψ1(z) and ψ2(z) separately.
Since ψ1(z) is an odd function and ψ2(z) is an even function, we only need to characterize
the functions for z ≥ 0.
To obtain the optimal ψ1(z), due to Jensen’s inequality, we have that
E{ψ′1(Z)2}
(E{ψ′1(Z)})2
≥ 1
for which the equality holds when ψ
′
1(z) is a constant. By setting ψ1(0) = 0, this function
satisfies the requirements on ψ1(z) (i.e., ψ1(z) is Fisher consistent and is an odd function).
For ψ2(z), we need to solve
min
E{ψ′2(Z)2}
(E{Zψ′2(Z)})2
=
∫∞
0
ψ
′
2(z)
2f0(z)dz
(
∫∞
0 zψ
′
2(z)f0(z)dz)
2
, (4.4)
s.t. E{ψ2} = 2
∫ ∞
0
ψ2(z)f0(z)dz = 0, (4.5)
ψ
′
2(z) ≥ 0.
in which we use the fact that ψ
′
2(z) is an odd function and f0(z) is a symmetric function,
while we use the requirement that ψ2(z) is an even function. Here, (4.5) is the Fisher
consistency requirement.
Proposition 4.2. The optimal ψ2(z) is given by the following form:
• ψ′2(z) = z∫∞
0
z2f0(z)dz
.
• ψ2(0) = −
∫∞
0
(∫ z
0 ψ
′
2(t)dt
)
f0(z)dz.
Proof. Please see Appendix B.
4.2.2. Optimal AIF vs IF Tradeoff
In Section 4.2.1, we characterize the optimal ψ1 and ψ2 that minimize AIF(ψ, F0, 2). As
we will see in the following, this choice will lead to an unbounded IF function. Hence, in
this section, we aim to minimize AIF(ψ, F0, 2) while putting an upperbound on IF.
In particular, for the location-scale model, the influence function can be written as
(see page 233 of (Hampel et al., 2009) and using the Fisher consistent constraint)
IF(z;T, F0) =
(
B−11 ψ1(z)
B−12 ψ2(z)
)
,
in which B1 = E{ψ′1(Z)} and B2 = E{Zψ
′
2(Z)}.
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Hence, the unstandardized gross-error sensitivity defined in (2.6) for the location-scale
model is given by
γ∗u = sup
z
√
B−21 ψ
2
1(z) +B
−2
2 ψ
2
2(z). (4.6)
It is easy to check that, if one uses ψ1(z) and ψ2(z) characterized in Section 4.2.1, γ
∗
u is
unbounded.
In the following, we aim to characterize ψ1(z) and ψ2(z) that minimize AIF(ψ, F0, 2)
while making sure that γ∗u is bounded. In particular, we have the following optimization
problem
min AIF(ψ, F0, 2), (4.7)
s.t. sup
z
||IF(z;T, F0)||22 ≤ ξ2,
for any given positive constraint ξ. As mentioned at the beginning of the section, we also
require ψ1 to be an odd function with nonnegative gradient and to be Fisher consistent,
and require ψ2 to be an even function with nonnegative gradient when z ≥ 0 and to be
Fisher consistent. Again, we only need to focus on the case when z ≥ 0.
Plugging the expression of AIF and IF, we have
min
√
E{ψ′1(Z)2}
(E{ψ′1(Z)})2
+
E{ψ′2(Z)2}
(E{Zψ′2(Z)})2
(4.8)
s.t. sup
z
[
ψ21(z)
(E{ψ′1(Z)})2
+
ψ22(z)
(E{Zψ′2(Z)})2
]
≤ ξ2. (4.9)
As both ψ
′
1(z) and ψ
′
2(z) are nonnegative, the sup in (4.9) are achieved when z is
either ∞ or 0. Hence, using the constraint that ψ1(z) is odd, the IF constraint can be
written as
max
{
ψ22(0)
E{Zψ′2(Z)}2
,
ψ22(∞)
(E{Zψ′2(Z)})2
+
ψ21(∞)
(E{ψ′1(Z)})2
}
≤ ξ2.
By setting ξ21 + ξ
2
2 = ξ
2, we can first solve the following two problems.
P1 : min
E{ψ′1(Z)2}
(E{ψ′1(Z)})2
s.t. ψ
′
1(z) ≥ 0,
ψ21(∞)
(E{ψ′1(Z)})2
≤ ξ21 ,
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and
P2: min
E{ψ′2(Z)2}
(E{Zψ′2(Z)})2
s.t. E{ψ2} = 0,
ψ
′
2(z) ≥ 0,
ψ22(∞)
(E{Zψ′2(Z)})2
≤ ξ22 ,
ψ22(0)
(E{Zψ′2(Z)})2
≤ ξ2.
After solving these problems for a given ξ21 and ξ
2
2 , we can then adjust the values ξ
2
1
and ξ22 to obtain the overall solution to the optimization problem (4.8). In P1, we do
not write the Fisher consistent constraint, as an odd function ψ1(z) will automatically
satisfy this constraint for symmetric f0(z).
Theorem 4.1. The optimal odd function ψ1(z) is specified by
ψ
′
1(z) =
[
ν∗ − ϑ
∗
1
f0(z)
]+
, (4.10)
in which ν∗ and ϑ∗1 are chosen to satisfy∫ ∞
0
ψ
′
1(z)f0(z)dz = 1,
ϑ∗1
(∫ ∞
0
ψ
′
1(z)dz − 2ξ1
)
= 0.
The optimal even function ψ2(z) have the following form:
ψ
′
2(z) =
[
ν∗z − ϑ
∗
2 + (ϑ
∗
1 − ϑ∗2)F0(z)
f0(z)
]+
(4.11)
and ψ2(0) = −
∫∞
0 ψ
′
2(z)(1 − F0(z))dz, in which the parameters ν∗, ϑ∗1 ≥ 0 and ϑ∗2 ≥ 0
satisfy ∫ ∞
0
zψ
′
2(z)f0(z)dz = 1, (4.12)
ϑ∗1
(∫ ∞
0
ψ
′
2(z)F0(z)dz − 2ξ2
)
= 0, (4.13)
ϑ∗2
(∫ ∞
0
ψ
′
2(z) [1− F0(z)] dz − 2ξ
)
= 0. (4.14)
Proof. Please see Appendix C.
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5. Numerical Examples
In this section, we provide numerical examples to illustrate the results obtained in this
paper.
5.1. Joint Location-Scale Estimation
In this example, we consider the adversarially robust joint location-scale estimation for
Laplace random variables. In this case, f0 has the following form
f0(z) =
1
2
exp(−|z|).
From Proposition 4.2, we know that the optimal ψ that minimizes AIF(ψ, F0, 2) has
the following form:
1. ψ1(0) = 0, ψ
′
1(z) = c with c being a constant.
2. ψ2(0) = −1 and ψ′2(z) = 2z.
In the following, using Theorem 4.1, we characterize the optimal ψ that minimizes
AIF(ψ, F0, 2) subject to the constraint that the ℓ2 norm of IF(x;T, F0) is upper-bounded
by ξ. We will only state the form of the functions for z ≥ 0 as ψ1(z) is an odd function
and ψ2(z) is an even function.
First, from (4.10), we know that the optimal form ψ
′
1(z) has the following form:
ψ
′
1(z) = ν
∗ − 2ϑ∗1 exp(z), 0 ≤ z ≤ a1,
in which a1 is the solution of
ν∗
2ϑ∗1
= exp(z),
and (ν∗, ϑ∗1) are chosen to satisfy∫ a1
0
(ν∗ exp(−z)− 2ϑ∗1) dz = 2,∫ a1
0
(ν∗ − 2ϑ∗1 exp(z)) dz = 2ξ1.
It is easy to check that these conditions can be simplified to
ν∗ − 2(a1 + 1)ϑ∗1 = 2,
(a1 − 1)ν∗ + 2ϑ∗1 = 2ξ1.
Using these, we can express the values of ν∗ and ϑ∗1 in terms of a1
ν∗ =
2 + 2(a1 + 1)ξ1
a21
, (5.1)
ϑ∗1 =
ξ1 − (a1 − 1)
a21
, (5.2)
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and the value of a1 is determined by
ea1 =
1+ (a1 + 1)ξ1
ξ1 + 1− a1 . (5.3)
For a given ξ1, the value of a1 can be obtained by solving (5.3) numerically. We can then
plug the value of a into (5.1) and (5.2) to obtain ν∗ and ϑ∗1.
Secondly, for a given ξ2, we determine the form of ψ2 in Theorem 4.1. For f0 considered
in Laplace random variables, we know that 1−F0(z) ≤ F0(z) when z ≥ 0. Using this fact
in (4.13) and (4.14) along with the fact that ξ2 ≤ ξ, we know that ϑ∗2 = 0 and ϑ∗1 6= 0.
Hence from Theorem 4.1, we know that ψ
′
2(z) has the following form
ψ
′
2(z) = ν
∗z − ϑ∗1(2 exp(z)− 1), 0 ≤ a2 ≤ z ≤ b,
in which both a2 and b satisfy
ν∗
ϑ∗1
=
2 exp(z)− 1
z
. (5.4)
Furthermore ν∗ and ϑ∗1 are determined by the following two equations (simplified from (4.13)
and (4.14)) ∫ b
a2
(ν∗z − ϑ∗1(2 exp(z)− 1)) z exp(−z)dz = 2,∫ b
a2
(ν∗z − ϑ∗1(2 exp(z)− 1)) (2− exp(−z)) dz = 4ξ2.
After simple integral and using the fact that a2, b satisfy (5.4), we can simplify the above
two equations to
ν∗
ϑ∗1
=
2(eb − ea2)− 2(ξ2 + 1)(b− a2) + ξ2(a22 − b2 + e−b2 − e−a)
0.5(b2 − a22) + (2ξ2 + 0.5)(e−b − e−a2)
, (5.5)
ϑ∗1
[
ν∗
ϑ∗1
2(e−b − e−a2) + b2 − a22 − e−b + e−a2 + 2(b− a2)
]
= −2. (5.6)
To find the value of ν∗ and ϑ∗1, we can first obtain ν
∗/ϑ∗1 (and hence the values of a2
and b) numerically from (5.4) and (5.5). After knowing ν∗/ϑ∗1, we can then use (5.6) to
obtain ϑ∗1.
Fig 1 illustrates the tradeoff between AIF and IF of the optimal M -estimator charac-
terized using the approach outlined above. In the figure, we also plot the curve for Huber
proposal 2 discussed in Example 4.2. From the figure, we can see that as IF increases
(less robust to outliers), AIF decreases (more robust to adversary modifications) and vice
verse. Furthermore, there is a gap between the tradeoff achieved by the Huber proposal
2 and the optimal tradeoff achieved by the estimator characterized above. The tradeoff
achieved by Huber proposal 2 in turn is better than that of the coupled mean and stan-
dard deviation estimator discussed in Example 4.1, for which achieves AIF =
√
2 but
IF =∞.
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Figure 1. The optimal tradeoff between AIF and IF for joint location-scale estimation in Laplace random
variables
5.2. Robust Linear Regression
In this section, we compare AIF of various robust regression methods discussed in Sec-
tion 3.2. In the following, we will adopt the commonly used coefficients wn =
√
1− hnn,
vn = 1/wn and use Huber function for η, that is
η(x) = max[−K,min(K,x)]. (5.7)
To proceed further, we need to compute
∂wn
∂xj,k
=
−1
2
√
1− hnn
∂hnn
∂xj,k
, (5.8)
∂vn
∂xj,k
=
1
2(1− hnn)3/2
∂hnn
∂xj,k
, (5.9)
both of which depend on ∂hnn/∂xj,k. Recall that hnn = x
T
n (XX
T )−1xn, which is a
complicated function of xj,k. To address this, we use X(−j) to denote the data matrix X
but with the jth column removed. To simplify notation, we let A = XXT and A(−j) =
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X(−j)X
T
(−j). We haveA = XX
T = X(−j)X
T
(−j)+xjx
T
j = A(−j)+xjx
T
j . Using Sherman-
Morrison formula, we have
A−1 = (A(−j) + xjx
T
j )
−1 = A−1(−j) −
A−1(−j)xjx
T
j A
−1
(−j)
1 + xTj A
−1
(−j)xj
.
Hence,
hnn = x
T
nA
−1xn = x
T
nA
−1
(−j)xn −
(
xTnA
−1
(−j)xj
)2
1 + xTj A
−1
(−j)xj
.
As the result, if j = n, we have
∂hnn
∂xn,k
=
2A−1(−n)(k, :)xn(
1 + xTnA
−1
(−n)xn
)2 .
If j 6= n, we have
∂hnn
∂xj,k
= −
2A−1(−n)(k, :)xn
(
1 + xTj A
−1
(−j)xj
)
− 2
(
xTnA
−1
(−j)xj
)2
A−1(−n)(k, :)xj(
1 + xTj A
−1
(−j)xj
)2 .
Plugging (5.8) and (5.9) into the corresponding equations of OLS, Huber’s proposal,
Mallow’s proposal and Schewppe’s proposal discussed in Section 3.2, we obtain the cor-
responding AIF.
Figure 2 illustrates the comparison of AIF for these methods for different value of
K, the parameter in the Huber function (5.7). In generating this figure, we set q = 5,
N = 500. We first generate θ using Gaussian zero mean and variance 1. After θ is
generated, it is fixed throughout the simulation. We let K to be from 3.05 to 5. For each
position, we run 100 times and obtain the average. We generate each entry ofX using i.i.d
with zero mean and variance 1. We then obtain yn by adding zero mean variance 2 noise
to θTxn. From the figure, we can see that for the same value of K, Mallow’s proposal has
the smallest value of AIF (i.e., it is the most robust again adversary modifications), the
AIF value of Scheweppe’s proposal is similar to Huber’s proposal. Furthermore, all three
approaches are more adversary modification resistant than OLS, which does not depend
on K. Furthermore, as K increases, the performance of all three methods approach that
of OLS. This is expected, as K increases, all three approaches are similar to OLS.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the adversarial robustness of multivariateM -Estimators.
We have characterized the adversary’s optimal modification strategy and its correspond-
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Figure 2. Adversarial robustness of Scheweppe and Mallow types of robust linear regression
ing AIF. Under certain regularity conditions, we have characterized the optimal M -
estimator for the case of joint location-scale estimation problem. We have further identi-
fied a tradeoff between robustness against adversarial modification and robustness against
outliers, and have derived the optimal M -estimator that achieves the best tradeoff.
Appendix A: Proof of f∗ = g∗
First, we show f∗ ≥ g∗.
To simplify the presentation, we let ci, i = 1, · · · , q be the i-th row of t′N (X). For any
σ ∈ Σ, we have
||t′N (X)Vec(∆X)||1 =
q∑
i=1
|ciVec(∆X)|
(a)
=
q∑
i=1
|σ(i)ciVec(∆X)|
≥
q∑
i=1
σ(i)ciVec(∆X), (A.1)
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in which (a) is true as each entry of σ is either 1 or −1. As this holds for any σ ∈ Σ,
hence f∗ ≥ g∗.
Next we show f∗ ≤ g∗.
||t′N (X)Vec(∆X)||1 =
q∑
i=1
|ciVec(∆X)| =
q∑
i=1
sign(ciVec(∆X))ciVec(∆X). Hence
f∗ = max
Vec(||∆X)||pp≤Nmδp
||t′N (X)Vec(∆X)||1
= max
σ∈Σ
max
sign(ciVec(∆X))=σ(i),||∆X)||
p
p≤Nmδp
q∑
i=1
σ(i)ciVec(∆X)
≤ max
σ∈Σ
max
||∆X)||pp≤Nmδp
q∑
i=1
σ(i)ciVec(∆X) = g
∗.
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 4.2
From (4.4), we have the following variational optimization problem
min
∫∞
0
ψ
′
2(z)
2f0(z)dz
(
∫∞
0
zψ
′
2(z)f0(z)dz)
2
, (B.1)
s.t.
∫ ∞
0
ψ2(z)f0(z)dz = ψ2(0) +
∫ ∞
0
(∫ z
0
ψ
′
2(t)dt
)
f0(z)dz = 0, (B.2)
ψ
′
2 ≥ 0.
As ψ2(0) does not appear in the objective function, we can solve (B.1) without the
constraint (B.2) first. After that, we can simply set
ψ2(0) = −
∫ ∞
0
(∫ z
0
ψ
′
2(t)dt
)
f0(z)dz
so that the constraint (B.2) will be satisfied.
In the following, to simplify the notation, we will use g(z) to denote ψ
′
2(z). It is clear
that the optimization problem is scale invariant in the sense that if g∗(z) is a solution to
this problem, then for any positive constant c, cg∗(z) is also a solution to this problem.
As a result, without loss of generality, we can assume
∫∞
0
zg(z)f0(z)dz = 1. Using this,
we can further simplify the optimization problem to
min
1
2
∫ ∞
0
g2(z)f0(z)dz,
s.t.
∫ ∞
0
zg(z)f0(z)dz = 1,
g(z) ≥ 0.
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For this convex calculus of variations problem, we form Lagrange function
L =
∫ ∞
0
1
2
g2(z)f0(z)dz + ν
(
−
∫ ∞
0
zg(z)f0(z)dz + 1
)
−
∫ ∞
0
λ(z)g(z)dz.
For any given z, the optimal value of g(z) can be found from
g∗(z)f0(z)− ν∗zf0(z)− λ∗(z) = 0, (B.3)
in which the parameters ν∗ and λ∗(z) ≥ 0 satisfy (Kot, 2014; Gregory and Lin, 1992)∫ ∞
0
g∗(z)f0(z)dz = 1,
λ∗(z)g(z) = 0. (B.4)
From (B.3), for z ≥ 0 in the range of f0(z), we have
g∗(z) =
λ∗(z) + ν∗zf0(z)
f0(z)
.
As z ≥ 0 and f0 ≥ 0, we know from (B.4) that λ∗(z) = 0, and hence
g∗(z) = ν∗z.
and the optimal value of ν∗ is
ν∗ =
1∫∞
0
z2f0(z)dz
.
As the result, for z in the range of f0(z), the optimal g
∗(z) is
g∗(z) =
z∫∞
0 z
2f0(z)dz
,
and ψ2(0) = −
∫∞
0
(∫ z
0
g∗(t)dt
)
f0(z)dz.
Appendix C: Proof of Theorem 4.1
We first focus on P1, and rewrite P1 into the following form
P1a : min
E{ψ′1(Z)2}
(E{ψ′1(Z)})2
=
∫∞
0
ψ
′
1(z)
2f0(z)dz
2(
∫∞
0 ψ
′
1(z)f0(z)dz)
2
,
s.t. ψ
′
1(z) ≥ 0,
ψ21(∞)(
E{ψ′1(Z)}
)2 =
(∫∞
0
ψ
′
1(z)dx
)2
4(
∫∞
0 ψ
′
1(z)f0(z)dz)
2
≤ ξ21 .
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Here, we use the constraint that ψ1(z) is an odd function.
To ease the notation, in the following, we use h(z) to denote ψ
′
1(z). It is clear that
the optimization problem is scale invariant, hence we can assume
∫∞
0 h(z)f0(z)dz = 1.
Hence, P1a can be simplified to
min
1
2
∫ ∞
0
h2(z)f0(z)dz,
s.t. h(z) ≥ 0,∫ ∞
0
h(z)dz ≤ 2ξ1,∫ ∞
0
h(z)f0(z)dz = 1.
To solve this convex functional minimization problem, we first form the Lagrangian
function
L = 1
2
∫ ∞
0
h2(z)f0(z)dz + ν
(
−
∫ ∞
0
h(z)f0(z)dz + 1
)
−
∫ ∞
0
λ(z)h(z)dz
+ϑ1
(∫ ∞
0
h(z)dz − 2ξ1
)
.
For any given z, the optimal value of h(z) can be found from
h∗(z)f0(z)− ν∗f0(z) + ϑ∗1 − λ∗(z) = 0, (C.1)
in which the parameters ν∗, ϑ∗1 ≥ 0 and λ∗(z) ≥ 0 satisfy (Kot, 2014; Gregory and Lin,
1992) ∫ ∞
0
h∗(z)f0(z)dz = 1,
ϑ∗1
(∫ ∞
0
h∗(z)dz − 2ξ1
)
= 0,
λ∗(z)h(z) = 0. (C.2)
From (C.1), for z ≥ 0 in the range of f0(z), we have
h∗(z) =
λ∗(z) + ν∗f0(z)− ϑ∗1
f0(z)
.
Combining this with condition (C.2), we know that if ν∗f0(z)−ϑ∗1 > 0, then λ∗(z) = 0.
On the other hand, if ν∗f0(z)− ϑ∗1 < 0, then h∗(z) = 0. As a result, we have
h∗(z) =
{
ν∗ − ϑ∗1f0(z) , ν∗f0(z) > ϑ∗1;
0, otherwise.
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This characterizes the optimal odd function ψ1(z).
We now focus on ψ2. We rewrite P2 into
P2a: min
E{ψ′2(Z)2}
(E{Zψ′2(Z)})2
=
∫∞
0 ψ
′
2(z)
2f0(z)dz
2(
∫∞
0 zψ
′
2(z)f0(z)dz)
2
,
s.t. E{ψ2} = 2ψ2(0) + 2
∫ ∞
0
[∫ z
0
ψ
′
2(t)dt
]
f0(z)dz = 0, (C.3)
ψ
′
2(z) ≥ 0,
ψ22(∞)(
E{Zψ′2(Z)}
)2 =
(
ψ2(0) +
∫∞
0 ψ
′
2(z)dz
)2
4
(∫∞
0
zψ
′
2(z)f0(z)dz
)2 ≤ ξ22 ,
ψ22(0)(
E{Zψ′2(Z)}
)2 = ψ22(0)
4
(∫∞
0 zψ
′
2(z)f0(z)dz
)2 ≤ ξ2.
We note that in P2a,∫ ∞
0
[∫ z
0
ψ
′
2(t)dt
]
f0(z)dz =
∫ ∞
0
ψ
′
2(z)(1− F0(z))dz.
To satisfy the Fisher consistent constraint (C.3) in P2a, we need to set
ψ2(0) = −
∫ ∞
0
ψ
′
2(z)(1− F0(z))dz.
Using these, P2a can be simplified to
P2b: min
E{ψ′2(Z)2}
(E{Zψ′2(Z)})2
=
∫∞
0 ψ
′
2(z)
2f0(z)dz
2(
∫∞
0 zψ
′
2(z)f0(z)dz)
2
,
s.t. ψ
′
2(z) ≥ 0,(
− ∫∞
0
ψ
′
2(z)(1− F0(z))dz +
∫∞
0
ψ
′
2(z)dz
)2
4
(∫∞
0 zψ
′
2(z)f0(z)dz
)2 ≤ ξ22 ,
(− ∫∞0 ψ′2(z)(1− F0(z))dz)2
4
(∫∞
0 zψ
′
2(z)f0(z)dz
)2 ≤ ξ2.
Similar to other cases, it is clear that P2b is scale invariant, and hence we can without
loss of generality assume that
∫∞
0 zψ
′
2(z)f0(z)dz = 1. Using this fact and denoting g(z) =
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ψ
′
2(z), P2b can be simplified to
P2b: min
1
2
∫ ∞
0
g(z)2f0(z)dz
s.t.
∫ ∞
0
g(z)F0(z)dz ≤ 2ξ2,∫ ∞
0
g(z)(1− F0(z))dz ≤ 2ξ,∫ ∞
0
zg(z)f0(z)dz = 1,
g(z) ≥ 0.
To solve this convex functional minimization problem, we first form the Lagrangian
function
L = 1
2
∫ ∞
0
g2(z)f0(z)dz + ν
(
−
∫ ∞
0
zg(z)f0(z)dz + 1
)
−
∫ ∞
0
λ(z)g(z)dz
+ϑ1
(∫ ∞
0
g(z)F0(z)dz − 2ξ2
)
+ ϑ2
(∫ ∞
0
g(z) [1− F0(z)] dz − 2ξ
)
.
For any given z, the optimal value of g(z) can be found from
g∗(z)f0(z)− ν∗zf0(z) + ϑ∗2 + (ϑ∗1 − ϑ∗2)F0(z)− λ∗(z) = 0, (C.4)
in which the parameters ν∗, ϑ∗1 ≥ 0, ϑ∗2 ≥ 0, λ∗(z) ≥ 0 satisfy∫ ∞
0
xg∗(z)f0(z)dz = 1,
ϑ∗1
(∫ ∞
0
g∗(z)F0(z)dz − 2ξ2
)
= 0,
ϑ∗2
(∫ ∞
0
g∗(z) [1− F0(z)] dz − 2ξ
)
= 0,
λ∗(z)g∗(z) = 0. (C.5)
From (C.4), for those z ≥ 0 with f0(z) > 0, we have
g∗(z) =
λ∗(z) + ν∗zf0(z)− ϑ∗2 − (ϑ∗1 − ϑ∗2)F0(z)
f0(z)
.
Combining this with the condition (C.5), we know that if ν∗zf0(z) − ϑ∗2 − (ϑ∗1 −
ϑ∗2)F0(z) > 0, then λ
∗(z) = 0. On the other hand, if ν∗f0(z)− ϑ∗2 − (ϑ∗1 − ϑ∗2)F0(z) < 0,
then g∗(z) = 0. As the result, we have
g∗(z) =
{
ν∗z − ϑ∗2+(ϑ∗1−ϑ∗2)F0(z)f0(z) , ν∗zf0(z) > ϑ∗1F0(z) + ϑ∗2(1− F0(z));
0, otherwise.
Coupled with ψ2(0) = −
∫∞
0
g∗(z)(1−F0(z))dz, this characterizes the optimal even ψ2(z).
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